Action relevance in linguistic context drives word-induced motor activity by Pia Aravena et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 01 April 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00163
Action relevance in linguistic context drives word-induced
motor activity
Pia Aravena1*, Mélody Courson1, Victor Frak2, Anne Cheylus1, Yves Paulignan1, Viviane Deprez1 and
Tatjana A. Nazir1
1 L2C2 Institut des Sciences Cognitives - Marc Jeannerod, CNRS/UCBL, Université Claude Bernard Lyon1, Bron, France
2 Département de Kinanthropologie, Faculté des Sciences, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada
Edited by:
Agustin Ibanez, Institute of
Cognitive Neurology, Argentina
Reviewed by:
Claudia Gianelli, University of
Potsdam, Germany
Giovanni Mirabella, University of La
Sapienza, Italy
Silvia Spadacenta, Eberhard Karls
University of Tübingen, Germany
*Correspondence:
Pia Aravena, L2C2 Institute of
Cognitive Science - Marc Jeannerod,
CNRS/UCBL, Université Claude
Bernard Lyon1, 67 Bd Pinel, 69675
Bron, France
e-mail: pia.aravena@isc.cnrs.fr
Many neurocognitive studies on the role of motor structures in action-language processing
have implicitly adopted a “dictionary-like” framework within which lexical meaning is
constructed on the basis of an invariant set of semantic features. The debate has thus
been centered on the question of whether motor activation is an integral part of the
lexical semantics (embodied theories) or the result of a post-lexical construction of a
situation model (disembodied theories). However, research in psycholinguistics show that
lexical semantic processing and context-dependent meaning construction are narrowly
integrated. An understanding of the role of motor structures in action-language processing
might thus be better achieved by focusing on the linguistic contexts under which such
structures are recruited. Here, we therefore analyzed online modulations of grip force
while subjects listened to target words embedded in different linguistic contexts. When
the target word was a hand action verb and when the sentence focused on that action
(John signs the contract) an early increase of grip force was observed. No comparable
increase was detected when the same word occurred in a context that shifted the focus
toward the agent’s mental state (John wants to sign the contract). There mere presence
of an action word is thus not sufficient to trigger motor activation. Moreover, when the
linguistic context set up a strong expectation for a hand action, a grip force increase was
observed even when the tested word was a pseudo-verb. The presence of a known action
word is thus not required to trigger motor activation. Importantly, however, the same
linguistic contexts that sufficed to trigger motor activation with pseudo-verbs failed to
trigger motor activation when the target words were verbs with no motor action reference.
Context is thus not by itself sufficient to supersede an “incompatible” word meaning. We
argue that motor structure activation is part of a dynamic process that integrates the lexical
meaning potential of a term and the context in the online construction of a situation model,
which is a crucial process for fluent and efficient online language comprehension.
Keywords: embodied language, context-dependency, lexical semantics, conceptual flexibility, situation models
INTRODUCTION
A growing number of evidence supports the idea that the
brain’s motor structures are implicated in the processing of
language referring to motor actions (for a review see Hauk
and Tschentscher, 2013). However, the crosstalk that the neu-
ral networks underlying motor actions entertain with language
processes is not well understood. Currently, the theoretical
approaches that aim at accounting for the role of motor acti-
vation during action-language processing mainly focus on the
question of whether language-induced motor activity should be
considered as an integral part of lexical semantics or, rather, as
resulting from ensuing “higher-level” processes involved in the
construction of mental representations of the described state of
affairs (Hauk et al., 2008a,b; Van Elk et al., 2010; Bedny and
Caramazza, 2011). Answering this question is believed to solve
the issue of whether motor activation is relevant for action-
language processing ormerely an epiphenomenon (for reviews on
the theoretical accounts in this debate, see Meteyard et al., 2012;
Pulvermüller, 2013). However, determining whether language-
induced motor activation is part of one of these two processes
implies considering lexical meaning access and the representation
of the situation described by the context as separated processes.
Such a dichotomic view, however, is grounded in models of
lexical meaning representation currently regarded as no longer
tenable (Hoenig et al., 2008; Raposo et al., 2009; see also Egorova
et al., 2013). A better understanding of language-induced motor
activity may thus require a shift in theoretical perspective.
Research on the role of language induced sensorimotor activa-
tion has generated a large body of sometimes conflicting exper-
imental results (see e.g., Hauk et al., 2004 vs. Postle, McMahon,
Ashton et al., 2008; Buccino et al., 2005 vs. Pulvermuller et al.,
2005; for a review see Willems and Francken, 2012). While these
inconsistencies could be seen as an obstacle for the understand-
ing of the crosstalk between language and motor structures, they
could alternatively be regarded as providing important insights
into the nature of this phenomenon: the heterogeneity in the
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findings could well indicate that the recruitment of sensorimotor
structures crucially depends on the linguistic and extra-linguistic
context (see Hoenig et al., 2008; Sato et al., 2008; Papeo et al.,
2009, 2012; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010; Mirabella et al., 2012;
Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013; for a recent review, see Yang, 2013;
see also van Dam et al., 2011; Willems and Casasanto, 2011).
That the context a word is uttered in partially determines its
meaning is well established among linguists and psycholinguists
(e.g., Allwood, 2003; Elman, 2011). According to Allwood (2003)
for instance, lexical meaning representations emerge from mul-
tiple interactions within a broad knowledge structure. This word
knowledge, that Allwood refers to as the “meaning potential” of a
word, comprises the set of all the information that the word has
been used to convey either by an individual or by a language com-
munity. Within the bounds of this meaning potential, the kind of
event, property, or entity a given word is taken to denote shift
according to the context the word occurs in.
In line with the above view, a vast number of psycholinguis-
tic studies have demonstrated early effects of context on lexical
semantics processing (for a review, see Spivey and Huette, 2013).
For example, Federmeier et al. (2007) recorded ERPs as partici-
pants read target words in weakly constraining (e.g., “Mary went
into her room to look at her gift”) or strongly constraining (e.g.,
“The child was born with a rare gift”) sentence contexts. The
authors analyzed the N400 ERP-component, whose magnitude
is positively correlated to interpretative problems, and found a
smaller N400 for the same target words in the strongly com-
pared to the weakly constraining contexts. The brain thus seems
to use context information to generate likely upcoming stimuli
and to prepare ahead of time for their processing (see also Kako
and Trueswell, 2000; Kamide et al., 2003; Chambers and Juan,
2008; Bicknell et al., 2010). Note that this “lexical anticipation”
phenomenon involves evaluating the contextual properties of a
word and not merely its characteristics as an entity of the men-
tal lexicon. The whole event evoked when processing a sentence
within a given context restricts the set of potential word referents
(Kako and Trueswell, 2000; Kamide et al., 2003; Chambers and
Juan, 2008; Bicknell et al., 2010; Kukona et al., 2011). In other
terms, lexical meaning access profits from a representational state
of the situation described by the context (e.g., Nieuwland and Van
Berkum, 2006; Hagoort and van Berkum, 2007; Metusalem et al.,
2012). This representational state, which can assimilate infor-
mation about time, social relations, mental acts, space, objects,
and events (MacWhinney, 2005; Frank and Vigliocco, 2011), has
been termed by linguists and philosophers as “mental models” or
“situation model” (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk and Kintsch,
1983; Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan and Madden, 2004).
As demonstrated by Nieuwland and Van Berkum (2006), sit-
uation models can even overrule constraints provided by core
lexical-semantic features such as animacy, which, in classic lin-
guistic semantics, is encoded in the mental lexicon. Hence, when
participants listened to a story about a dancing peanut that had
a big smile, the canonical inanimate predicate “salted” for the
inanimate object “peanut” elicited a larger N400 component
than the animate predicate “in love.” Situation models can thus
neutralize processing difficulties due to animacy violations, con-
firming that lexical meaning does not necessarily involve an initial
context-independent semantic computation.
Despite the remarkable body of evidence regarding the con-
text dependency of lexical meaning, these results have rarely
been taken into account in the cognitive neuroscience literature
that discusses the role of motor structures in action-language
processing. In fact, many researchers in this domain seem to
have implicitly relied on theoretical views that apprehend word
recognition and semantic processing in a form-driven, exhaus-
tive, bottom-up fashion (Swinney and Love, 2002; MacDonald
and Seidenberg, 2006). In this manner, semantic and pragmatic
context exerts its effects only after word meaning has been
elaborated. What is more, it seems as if it is tacitly assumed
that words have fixed meanings that are accessed like entries
in a dictionary (c.f. “conceptual stability”; Hoenig et al., 2008.
See also Elman, 2011). However, within a theoretical frame
that considers lexical meaning access as an interactive pro-
cess, integrating information from many different sources, the
question of whether language-induced motor activation is an
integral part of lexical meaning or a mere effect of the ensu-
ing construction of a situation model (Hauk et al., 2008a,b;
Chatterjee, 2010; Bedny and Caramazza, 2011) does not make
sense. Therefore, this issue will not satisfactorily inform the
main interrogation regarding the function of motor activation
in action-language processing. We believe that an understanding
of the role of motor structures in the construction of linguis-
tic meaning requires a detailed exploration of the context under
which motor structures are recruited during action-language
processing.
Critical results along this line were provided by Taylor and
Zwaan (2008). These authors demonstrated that in a sentence
describing a manual rotation (e.g., “He placed his hand on the
gas cap, which he opened slowly”), compatible motor responses
(i.e., manual rotation of a knob in a congruent direction with the
linguistically described activity) are facilitated during reading the
verb “opened.” Motor responses are also facilitated while read-
ing of the adverb that modifies the action verb (i.e., “slowly”),
but not while reading of the adverbs that modify the agent (e.g.,
“He placed his hand on the gas cap, which he opened happily”).
According to Taylor and Zwaan (2008), the difference between
the two conditions is explained by the fact that the adverbs that
modify the action maintain the linguistic semantic focus on the
action described in the sentence. Note that these results suggest
that motor structure activation is sustained beyond the lexical-
entity of the action term, extending to the broader linguistic
event in which the word is embedded. Results from our labo-
ratory further support this view. By analyzing online grip force
variations that index cerebral motor activity in response to tar-
get words (c.f. Frak et al., 2010), our study revealed an increase
of grip force starting around 200ms after the onset of a manual
action word when the word occurred in an affirmative sentence
(e.g., “Fiona lifts the luggage”), but not when it occurred in a
negative sentential context (“Fiona does not lift the luggage”)
(Aravena et al., 2012). Our interpretation of these data is that in
affirmative context, motor features of the target word are acti-
vated because of the relevance of the action within the situation
model. In negative contexts the motor features remain irrelevant
in spite of the actual presence of the action word in the sentence,
because the sentence-induced situation model does not focus on
the action.
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In the present study, we present two experiments that further
investigate how the sentential context modulates word-induced
motor activation. As in our previous studies (Frak et al., 2010;
Aravena et al., 2012), we measured grip force variations while
subjects listen to words that describe manual motor actions. Note
that an increase of word-induced grip force can be interpreted as
an incomplete inhibition of the output of primary motor cortex
activity (Jeannerod, 1994; Frak et al., 2010). No motor task asso-
ciated to the linguistic process was required, as participants were
asked to count how many sentences contain a name of a country.
This ensured the ecology of the experimental environment as it
simulates a quite natural linguistic situation.
In Experiment 1 we set out to investigate the effect of linguis-
tic focus on action-verb induced motor activity by making use of
the volition modality (“want to do,” see Morante and Sporleder,
2012). Volition is a grammatical modality that pertains to the
intentions of an agent with respect to an action. It sets an action
in an irrealis mood indicating that the relevant situation or action
has not yet happened. Indeed, wanting to do X presupposes that
X is not currently being done or taking place. Hence, the situ-
ation model evoked by the volition modality does not focus a
motor action. In Experiment 2 we assessed the degree of context-
dependency of language-induced motor activation by measuring
motor activity at the point where the target word is expected. For
example, for an utterance beginning with “With his black pen,
James. . . ” the word “writes” is a continuation that is far more
likely than the word “walk,” as the former evokes a more plau-
sible action for the use of the “black pen” (see Bicknell et al.,
2010; Matsuki et al., 2011). To investigate the anticipatory effects
of an action context on the subsequent word processing, we used
either a pseudo-verb with no associated reference or a verb whose
associated reference was incompatible with the action meaning
anticipated by the context. In keeping with the findings of our
experiment with negative contexts, we predicted that the pro-
cessing of an action word should neither be sufficient nor even
necessary to activate motor structures. Hence:
(a) An action word (e.g., to soap) embedded in a volitional sen-
tence whose focus is on the mental state of the agent (i.e.,
“Jamal wants to soap his dirty shirt”) should not trigger an
increased grip force.
(b) In a context that primes properties of a hand-action verb, a
pseudo-verb (e.g., “With his black pen, Paul griles the con-
tract”) should suffice to trigger an increase in grip force.
However, given that contextual parameters are actualized
rapidly by incoming words, contextual cues that could other-
wise trigger motor activity should fail to do so if the ensuing
verb is not compatible with the anticipated action meaning
(e.g., “With his black pen, Paul plans to sign the contract”).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
EXPERIMENT 1: VOLITION
Ethics statement
All of the participants in this study gave an informed written
consent. The study was approved by the Ethical Committee CPP
(Comité de Protection des Personnes) Sud-Est II in Lyon, France.
Participants
All of the participants were French undergraduate students (18–
35 years old; mean age = 21.7, SD = 1.5) and right-handed
Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971), with normal
hearing and no reported history of psychiatric or neurological
disorders. Twenty-five participants (including 13 females) par-
ticipated in this study. Eight participants were eliminated from
the analysis due to an extremely weak signal throughout the
experiment, thus preventing the capture of grip-force. We used
a grip-force mean below 0.13V in combination with the absence
of signal changes throughout the experiment as criteria for dis-
carding participants from the analyses.
Stimuli
A total of 115 French sentences served as stimuli (see
Supplementary Material). Ten were distractor-sentences con-
taining a country name. The data from the trials using the
distractor-sentences were not included in the analysis. Thirty-
five target-action words were embedded into action-in-focus and
volition-in-focus sentences resulting in 70 total sentences corre-
sponding to the two conditions of the experiment: the action-
in-focus and the volition-in-focus condition. All of the target
action words were verbs denoting actions performed with the
hand or arm (e.g., scratch or throw). Thirty-five sentences con-
taining common nouns denoting concrete entities with no motor
associations were used for comparison with earlier studies (e.g.,
Frak et al., 2010; Aravena et al., 2012). The target nouns and
verbs were controlled for frequency, number of letters, number
of syllables and bi- and trigram frequency (New et al., 2001,
see Supplementary Material). Three examples of experimental
stimuli are provided in Table 1.
All critical verbs were in the present tense and in neutral 3rd
person. Verbs always occurred in the same position of the sen-
tence. The sentences were spoken by a French male adult. His
voice was recorded using Adobe Soundbooth and the recordings
were adjusted to generate similar trial lengths using the Audacity
1.2.6 software. Two pseudo-randomized sentences lists were gen-
erated from trials; these lists contained uniform distributions of
the different sentence types. The two lists were alternated between
participants. The mean word duration was 459ms (SD = 97ms)
Table 1 | Example of stimuli used in the Experiment 1 and their
approximate English translation.
Condition Sentence English approximate
translation
Action-in-focus Dans la salle de sport,
Fiona soulève des
haltères.
At the gym, Fiona lifts the
dumbbells.
Volition-in-focus A l’intérieur de l’avion,
Laure veut soulever son
bagage.
In the plane, Laure wants
to lift her luggage.
Nouns Au printemps, Edmonde
aime le bosquet de fleur
de son jardin.
In the spring, Edmonde
loves the flower-bush in
her garden
Underlined words represent the target words. Words in bold type represent the
linguistic focus of the sentence.
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for the nouns and 415ms (SD = 78ms) for the verbs. There was
an interval of 2000ms between the sentence presentations.
Equipment and data acquisition
Two distinct computers were used for data recording and stim-
ulus presentation to ensure synchronization between audio files
and grip-force measurements (estimated error <5ms). The first
computer read the play-list of the pseudo-randomized stimuli.
The second computer received two triggers from the first com-
puter, which indicated the beginning and the end of the play-list.
This second computer also recorded the incoming force signals
from the load cell at a high sampling rate of 1 KHz. To measure
the activity of the hand muscles, a standalone 6-axis load cell of
68 g was used (ATI Industrial Automation, USA, see Figure 1).
In the present study, force torques were negligible due to the
absence of voluntary movement; thus, only the three main forces
were recorded: Fx, Fy, and Fz as the longitudinal, radial and
compression forces, respectively (Figure 1B).
Procedure
Participants wore headphones and were comfortably seated
behind a desk on which a pad was placed. They were asked to rest
their arms on the pad, holding the grip-force sensor in a precision
grip with their right hand (see Figure 1). The thumb, index, and
middle fingers remained on the load cell throughout the exper-
iment. Holding the sensor with the index, thumb, and middle
finger implies more stability of the object (i.e., less grip force vari-
ations due to finger adjustments) than holding it with the index
and thumb only.
FIGURE 1 | Experimental material and setting. (A) A standalone 6-axis
load cell of 68 g was used (ATI Industrial Automation, USA). (B) The three
main forces were recorded: Fx, Fy, and Fz as the longitudinal, radial and
compression forces, respectively. (C) Participants hold the grip-force sensor
in a precision grip with their right hand. Bottom panel: participants wore
headphones and were comfortably seated behind a desk on which a pad
was placed. They were asked to rest their arms on the pad, holding the
sensor.
The Experimenter demonstrated how to hold the grip sensor
and participants were requested to hold the cell without applying
voluntary forces.
The cell was suspended and not in contact with the table.
The participants kept their eyes closed for the duration of the
experiment. They were verbally instructed to listen to the spoken
sentences. Their task was to silently count how many sentences
contained the name of a country. To avoid muscular fatigue,
a break of 10 s was given every 3min. The total length of the
experiment was 12min.
Data analysis
Prior to the data analysis, each signal component was pre-
treated with the Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0 software (Brain Vision
Analyzer software, Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany).
The data were filtered at 10Hz with a fourth-order, zero-phase,
low-pass Butterworth filter, and a notch filter (50Hz) was applied
in case that artifact caused by electrical power lines would have
persisted. Finally, a baseline correction was performed on the
mean amplitude of the interval from −400 to 0ms prior to word
onset. The baseline correction was implemented because of a
possible global change in grip-force during the session (12min),
and because we are only interested in grip-force changes. Thus,
we adjusted the post-stimulus values by the values present in
the baseline period. A simple subtraction of the baseline values
from all of the values in the epoch was performed. As the par-
ticipants were asked to hold the grip-force sensor throughout
the experiment, a “negative” grip-force refers to a lesser grip-
force and not to the absence of grip-force, which is impossible
in this context. Only Fz (compression force) was included in
the analysis as this parameter was determined to be the most
accurate indicator of prehensile grip-force. The Fz signals were
segmented offline into 1200ms epochs spanning from 400ms
pre-stimulus onset to 800ms post-stimulus. The segments with
visually detectable artifacts (e.g., gross hand movements) and the
trials that showed oscillations exceeding the participant’s mean
force were isolated and discarded from the analysis. A mean
of 6.04 segments (17.2%) were discarded per condition. The
Fz signals for action words in action-in-focus, action words in
volition-in-focus and nouns were averaged for each participant
and the grand mean was computed for each condition.
We selected three time windows (i.e., 100–300, 300–500, and
500–800ms after word onset) that were identified as critical
phases during the processing of words in auditory sentences in
Friederici’s (2002) model and that were used previously in our
work for language-induced grip-force analysis (Aravena et al.,
2012). Given that the conduction time between the primary
motor cortex (M1) and hand muscle is approximately 18–20ms
(estimations using TMS, Rossini et al., 1999), we added 20ms to
each of these windows, resulting in 120–320ms for the first win-
dow, 320–520ms for the second time window and 520–800ms for
the third.
For each condition, the averaged grip-force values in the
three time windows were compared with their proper baseline
(i.e., averaged grip-force values over the segment between −400
and 0ms before target word onset) using a one-sample t-test
against zero; for a window that presented significant grip-force
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modulations with respect to the baseline, a comparison between
the conditions was performed using repeated measures of
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Post-hoc two-by-two comparisons
were performed using the Bonferroni test. Since statistical sig-
nificance is heavily dependent upon sample size, and our study
sample was smaller than 20, we also report “effect sizes” (Cohen’s
d; Cohen, 1988). An effect size is calculated by taking the dif-
ference of the mean between two conditions and dividing this
difference by the pooled standard deviation of the two conditions.
This allows estimating how many standard deviations difference
there is between the conditions. According to Cohen (1988) and
effect size of.20 (i.e., a difference of a fifth of the standard devia-
tion) is a small effects size. A medium effect size is 0.50 and a large
effect size is 0.80.
EXPERIMENT 2: PSEUDO-VERBS
Ethics statement
All participants in this study gave an informed written consent.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee CPP (Comité
de Protection des Personnes) Sud-Est II in Lyon, France.
Participants
All of the participants were French undergraduate students (18–
35 years old; mean age = 21.7, SD = 2.1) and right-handed
[Edinburgh Inventory definition (Oldfield, 1971)], with normal
hearing and no reported history of psychiatric or neurological
disorders. Nineteen subjects (including 10 females) participated
in this study and none had participated in Experiment 1.
Stimuli
A total of 158 French sentences served as stimuli (see
Supplementary Material). Ten were distractor-sentences contain-
ing a country name. The data from the trials using the distractor-
sentences were not included in the analysis.
For this experiment, 37 pseudo-verbs were created obeying
French’s phonotactic constraints using the Lexique Toolbox
of the data base Lexique 3 (New et al., 2001). The soundness
of the verb as a French verb was controlled (see Supplementary
Material). Thirty-seven target non-action words were utilized. All
non-action words were verbs denoting no action performed with
the hand or arm (e.g., decide, think), as confirmed by the stim-
uli validation process (see Supplementary Material). Thirty-seven
target action words were included. All action words were verbs
denoting actions performed with the hand or arm (e.g., scratch
or throw) as established by the stimuli validation process (see
Supplementary Material).
All the target words were controlled for frequency, number of
letters, number of syllables, and bi- and trigram frequency (New
et al., 2001).
The 37 action verbs, the 37 pseudo-verbs, and the 37 non-
action verbs were embedded into action contexts. The 37 target
non-action verbs were also embedded into non-action contexts.
Action contexts were designed in such a way that the first
adverbial phrase and the subject of the sentence coded a situation,
which anticipated a hand action. The degree of effector speci-
ficity (i.e., hand action) of action contexts and the action verb
cloze probability were controlled. The “degree of effector speci-
ficity” was defined as how representative of a hand action was the
action encoded by the sentence. All actions encoded by sentences
were highly prototypical as hand actions. Cloze probability was
defined as how easy was to anticipate a hand action verb from the
previous sentential context. Only the contexts that induce highly
cloze probability of hand action verbs were considered as action
contexts (see Supplementary Material).
In summary, the present study exploited four conditions:
(a) action context actionverb condition (action verb in action
context)
(b) action context pseudoverb condition (pseudo-verb in action
context)
(c) action context non-actionverb condition (non-action verb in
action context)
(d) non-action context non-actionverb condition (non-action in
non-action context).
Four examples of experimental stimuli are provided in Table 2.
All critical verbs were in the present tense and in neutral 3rd
person. Verbs always occurred in the same sentential position
(see Table 2). The sentences were spoken by a French female
adult. Her voice was recorded using Adobe Soundbooth and the
recordings were adjusted to generate similar trial lengths using
the Audacity 1.2.6 software. Three lists of 37 action contexts (A,
B, and C) were created to avoid context repetition between the
three action context conditions. Action words were included in
A, when pseudo-verbs were included in B and non-action words
in C, and they were included in B when pseudo-verbs were in C
and non-action in A, etc. Therefore, three pseudo-randomized
sentences lists were generated from such balanced combination
(ABC, BCA, CBA) in addition to the non-action C-non-action V
list and the 10 country sentences. These lists contained uniform
distributions of the different sentence types. The three lists were
alternated between participants. The mean word duration was
459ms (SD = 97ms). There was an interval of 2000ms between
the sentence presentations.
Table 2 | Example of stimuli used in the Experiment 2 and their
approximate English translation.
Condition Sentence English approximate
translation
Actioncontext
Actionverb
Avec son stylo noir, Paul
signe
le contrat
With his black pen, Paul
signs the contract
Actioncontext
Pseudoverb
Avec son stylo noir, Paul
grile le
Contrat
With his black pen, Paul
griles the contract
Actioncontext
Non-actionverb
Avec son stylo noir, Paul
projette de signer le
contrat
With his black pen, Paul
plans to sign the contract
Non-actioncontext
Non-actionverb
Une fois de plus, Thomas
songe à rassembler toute
la famille
One more time, Thomas
dreams to assemble all
the family
Underlined words represent the target words.
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Equipment and data acquisition
The equipment and data acquisition from Experiment 1 were
used in Experiment 2 (see also Aravena et al., 2012).
Procedure
The procedure from Experiment 1 was repeated with the excep-
tion that in the current experiment prior to the beginning of test
participants were verbally instructed to apply a specific minimal
force on the cell (i.e., between 0.08 and 0.13V; that was sur-
veyed by the experimenter in the visual signal online registration
software) and maintain it throughout all the experiment without
applying other voluntary forces. This instruction served to assure
the operative capture of the signal, insofar as an extremely weak
signal prevents the detection of grip-force variations as shown in
Experiment 1 (from which eight participants were eliminated due
to frail signals). The total length of the experiment was 18min.
Data analysis
The analysis used for Experiment 2 was the same used in
Experiment 1.
RESULTS
RESULTS EXPERIMENT 1: VOLITION
Figure 2 plots the variations in grip-force amplitude as a func-
tion of time after target word onset for the three experimental
conditions (volition-in-focus condition, action-in-focus condi-
tion, and nouns condition). The top panel displays individual
data for the three conditions and the bottom panel compares data
of the three conditions averaged over all participants. As is obvi-
ous from the figure, for the action-in-focus condition a steady
increase in the grip force [the compression force component of
the load cell (Fz)] was observed soon after target words presen-
tations and it is maintained until the last interval. By contrast,
the volition and the nouns condition remained nearly constant at
baseline.
For the action-in-focus condition the test against the base-
line revealed a significant increase in the grip-force in the three
time windows [p = 0.013, p = 0.009, p = 0.005 for 120–320,
320–520, 520–800ms respectively]. No significant effects against
baseline were observed for the volition-in-focus or for the nouns
condition.
The ANOVA revealed significant effects of the conditions in
the last two time windows [F(2, 32) = 3.4505, p = 0.043 and
F(2, 32) = 5.6477, p = 0.007 respectively]. Post-hoc comparison
(Bonferroni) for the second window showed that the Action
condition (M = 0.08V, SD = 0.1) differed significantly from the
Volition condition (M = −0.01V, SD = 0.1) [p = 0.05] and just
failed to be significantly different from the Noun condition
(M = − 0.009V, SD = 0.08) [p = 0.06 ns]. In the last win-
dow post-hoc comparison revealed that the Action condition
(M = 0.14V, SD = 0.19) different from the Volition condition
(M = − 0.02V, SD = 0.18) [p = 0.02] as well as from the Noun
condition (M = −0.03V, SD = 0.8) [p = 0.007]. Table 3 sum-
marizes the effect sizes (Cohen d) of the different comparisons.
In all time windows large effect sizes were found for the differ-
ence between the Action vs. Nouns conditions as well as between
the Action vs. Volition conditions.
All together these analyses confirm that the same action words
embedded in sentences whose focus is on the mental state of the
agent do not increase grip force in the same way as when they are
embedded within sentences that focus the action.
RESULTS EXPERIMENT 2: PSEUDO-VERBS
Figure 3 plots the variations in grip-force amplitude as a func-
tion of time after target word onset for the four experimental
conditions (action-action condition, action-pseudo-verb condi-
tion, action-non-action condition, and non-action-non-action
condition). The top panel displays individual data for the four
conditions and the bottom panel compares data of the four condi-
tions averaged over all participants. As is obvious from the figure,
for the action-action condition and the action-pseudo-verb con-
dition, a steady increase in the grip force [the compression force
component of the load cell (Fz)] was early observed, and main-
tained until the last interval. By contrast, the action-non-action
condition appeared to cause a drop in the grip-force. Finally,
non-action-non-action condition remained nearly constant at
baseline.
For the Action-Action condition, the test against the base-
line revealed a significant increase in the grip-force in the three
time windows [p = 0.01, p = 0.02, and p = 0.04 for 120–320,
320–520, 520–800ms respectively]. For the Action-Pseudo-verb
condition, the test against the baseline also revealed a signifi-
cant increase in the grip-force in the three time windows [p =
0.01, p = 0.006, and p = 0.01, respectively]. No significant effects
against baseline were observed for the non-action verbs in the
action context or for the non-action-non-action condition. The
ANOVA was significant in all time windows [F(3, 54) = 4.558,
p = 0.0064, F(3, 54) = 5.2004, p = 0.0032, and F(3, 54) = 3.251,
p = 0.0287, for the first, second and third window, respectively].
Results of the post-hoc tests (Bonferroni) are plotted in Table 4.
The comparison of the three critical conditions (Action-Non-
action vs. Action-Action and Action-Pseudo-verbs) revealed sig-
nificant effects in the first two time windows. First time window:
Action-Non-action condition (M = −0.1V, SD = 0.19) differed
significantly from the Action-Action (M = 0.099V, SD = 0.15)
[p = 0.01] as well as from the Action-Pseudo-verbs condi-
tions (M = 0.08V, SD = 0.13) [p = 0.019]. Second time win-
dow: Action-Non-action condition (M = −0.1V, SD = 0.3) vs.
Action-Action condition (M = 0.16V, SD = 0.28) [p = 0.006]
and vs. Action-Pseudo-verb condition (M = 0.12V, SD = 0.16)
[p = 0.029]. In the third time window the same tendency was
also evident but the differences with the Action-Non-action con-
dition did not reached significance: Action-Non-action condition
(M = − 0.11V, SD = 0.3) vs. Action-Action condition (M =
0.16V, SD = 0.34) [p = 0.061] and vs. Action-Pseudo-verb con-
dition (M = 0.13V, SD = 0.23) [p = 0.123]. By contrast, the
comparison with the Non-action-Non action condition did not
survive the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison (all
p’s> 0.05).
Table 5 summarizes the effect sizes (Cohen d) of the different
comparisons. In all time windows large effect sizes were found for
the difference between the Action-Action vs. Action Non-action
conditions as well as between the Action-Pseudoword vs. Action
Non-action conditions. In the second and third time windows
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FIGURE 2 | Modulation of the grip-force amplitude as a function of time
after target onset in Experiment 1 (Volition). (A–C) displays individual data
for the three conditions (the bold lines represent the means and standard
deviations) and (D) compares data of the three conditions averaged over all
participants. In (D) we also show the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.)
around the mean value across the subjects (shaded regions). For the
action-in-focus condition a significant increase in the grip force was observed
soon after target words presentations and it is maintained over the three
intervals. This enhanced grip-force is significantly different from the volition
condition in the two last windows and from the nouns conditions in the last
window. The color of the asterisk refers to the color of the condition that is
compared.
medium to large effect sizes were also found between the Action-
Action vs. Non-action Non-action conditions and between the
Action-Pseudoword vs. Non-action Non-action conditions.
DISCUSSION
Our experiments were designed to explore the impact of local lin-
guistic context on word-induced neural activation ofmotor struc-
tures. There are two main results of this study. First, compatible
with previous findings (Taylor and Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan et al.,
2010) our work shows that linguistic focus as defined by Taylor
and Zwaan (2008) modulates language-induced motor activity.
The presence of an action word in an utterance is not in itself
sufficient to trigger a related motor activation (see also Raposo
et al., 2009; Aravena et al., 2012; Schuil et al., 2013). Second, our
data further shows that the linguistic surrounding and the knowl-
edge of situation it sets up can be sufficient to activate the motor
properties of a contextually expected action verb. The actual pres-
ence of a known action word is not necessary for the activation
of motor structures (for similar results in pragmatic context, see
Van Ackeren et al., 2012). Importantly, however, the very same
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Table 3 | Cohen’s d for the differences between the various conditions
in the three time windows.
Nouns Volition
TIME WINDOW 120–320ms
Action 0.92 0.78
Volition 0.13
TIME WINDOW 320–520ms
Action 0.99 0.76
Volition 0.08
TIME WINDOW 520–800ms
Action 1.26 0.92
Volition 0.08
context can nonetheless fail to trigger relevant motor activation
if the tested lexical item is a familiar word that has no associated
motor features. Hence, contextual expectations set up by a given
utterance are not in themselves sufficient to supersede a lexical
meaning that does not involve a motor content. On the basis of
this evidence, we argue that language-induced motor activation is
neither driven by purely context-free lexical meaning access nor
the result of a fully post-lexical higher order operation. Rather, the
activation of motor structure results from the dynamic interac-
tions of available lexical and contextual information that take part
in the online construction of a complex mental model associated
with the processing of a sentence meaning.
In Experiment 1, we used the modal operator “vouloir” (to
want) to manipulate the mode of access to a described action
by shifting the linguistic focus toward the agent’s attitude with
respect to the action. “Modality” is a grammatical category that
allows relativizing the validity of sentence meaning to a set of
possible situations (Perkins and Fawcett, 1983). Agent-oriented
modalities focus on the internal state of an agent with respect to
the action expressed by a predicate (Bybee et al., 1994). Volition
thus focalizes the sentence on the agent’s attitude toward the
action rather than on the action itself (Morante and Sporleder,
2012). Our results show that motor structures were only recruited
when the action verb was the focus of the sentence meaning and
not when the sentence meaning focused on the agent’s attitude
toward the action. These findings are consistent with the linguis-
tic focus hypothesis proposed by Taylor and Zwaan (2008) (see
also Zwaan et al., 2010; Gilead et al., 2013). However, our study
goes beyond what these authors found. Recall that Taylor and
Zwaan (2008) showed that language-induced motor activation
could “spill-over” from the actual action word to the linguistically
adjacent post-verbal adverb, provided that the adverb modified
the action. Our study goes further than these results because
we show that motor activation for the action word itself can be
switched on and off as a function of the linguistic focus. Critically,
our study also provides the timing of the contextually constrained
word induced motor activation: linguistic focus modulates motor
activity within a temporal window that has been associated with
lexical semantic retrieval (i.e., 300–500ms after word onset, see
Friederici, 2002).
The results of our first experiment thus suggest that the pro-
cessing of an action verb can rapidly activate motor features
of a denoted action. However, these motor features are only
recruited when the denoted action is relevant within the currently
elaborated situation model. The sensitivity of language-induced
motor activation to the relationship between context and lexi-
cal semantics suggests that motor structures could serve semantic
specification.
The findings of Experiment 2 show that word induced motor
activation involves an early evaluation of the context against
which the relevance of the action features of the potential verbs
are determined (for studies on the anticipatory referential inter-
pretation see, e.g., Kako and Trueswell, 2000; Kamide et al., 2003;
Chambers and Juan, 2008; Bicknell et al., 2010). Our sentences
were designed so that a fronted adverbial phrase and the subject
of the sentence set up a situation in which a hand action was antic-
ipated (i.e., the action context). Following this sentential context
the ensuing verb was either a verb denoting a hand action, a verb
denoting non-action, or a pseudo-verb unknown to the subject.
As expected, when the verb denoted a hand action, an increase of
grip force was observed shortly after word onset. Critically, grip
force also increased with a pseudo-verb unknown to the listener,
but not when a known verb with no motor denotation was pre-
sented instead (e.g., “With his black pen, James plans to . . . ”).
These data clearly testify that the increase of grip force was not
merely an effect of context. One plausible explanation for our
finding is that when a sentence contains an unknown word, the
process of meaning construction fills the semantic gap with the
most adequate content within the given context (in our case an
action performed with the hand) until more information is avail-
able. In other terms, the listener maintains the situation model
elaborated from previous context and integrates the unknown
word into this representation. In our experiment, the instrument
described in the adverbial phrase as well as the human agent
(i.e., “With his black pen, James. . . ”) anticipate hand-action rel-
evant motor features. By integrating this information the listener
models a situation that foresees a particular action as a plausi-
ble thematic relation. When the ensuing verb is unknown to the
listener the elaborated situation model is maintained and motor
structures are recruited. However, when the ensuing verb is a
known word that does not refer to an action, the non-action verb
updates the modeled situation and cancels action representation
anticipated by the context. Thus, contextual parameters might be
understood as part of a representational state that is constantly
restructured and revised following incoming information (see
also McRae et al., 2005; Bicknell et al., 2010; Matsuki et al., 2011).
The results of our second experiment thus suggest that the
construction of a situation model allows making rapid infer-
ences and predictions for the elaboration of linguistic meaning.
The brain generates a continuous stream of multi-modal predic-
tions and pattern completion based on previous experiences (see,
for example, Barsalou, 2009). This drive to predict is a power-
ful engine for online language comprehension (Federmeier, 2007;
Elman, 2009).
In conclusion, together with our previous findings (Aravena
et al., 2012) the present results indicate that the recruitment of
motor structures during the processing of an action word hinges
on specific conditions: (i) the context must focus on a motor
action and (ii) the tested word form must not be incompatible
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FIGURE 3 | Modulation of the grip-force amplitude as a function of
time after target onset in Experiment 2 (Pseudo-verbs). (A–D)
Displays individual data for the four conditions (the bold lines represent
the means and standard deviations) and (E) compares data of the four
conditions averaged over all participants. In (E) we also show the
standard error of the mean (s.e.m.) around the mean value across the
subjects (shaded regions). For the action-action condition and the
action-pseudo-verb condition, a significant increase in the grip force was
early observed, and maintained until the last interval. This enhanced
grip-force is significantly different from action-non-action condition in the
two first intervals. The color of the asterisk refers to the color of the
condition that is compared.
with a contextually anticipated action, i.e., it has to be either
compatible or neutral as in the case of a pseudo-verb. Hence,
the processing of an action word does not recruit motor struc-
tures constantly. The same action word form that provokes motor
activity in one linguistic context will cease to do so in another
one. Note further that in conditions in which word processing
recruits motor structures, this language-induced motor activity
is observed within the time frames in which lexical meaning
are believed to be retrieved (Friederici, 2002; Swinney and Love,
2002).
Although an increasing number of recent studies has started
to account for the context dependency of motor activity (e.g.,
Sato et al., 2008; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010; Mirabella et al., 2012;
Papeo et al., 2012; Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013) the majority
of research programs are still strongly rooted in a “dictionary-
like” perspective of word meaning (see Elman, 2004, 2011; Evans,
2006; Evans and Green, 2006 for critical reviews). The novelty
of our work resides in the explicit integration of a theoretical
and experimental framework that could serve to link current
models of sentence processing to neurobiological data on action-
meaning representation. The here observed on/off switching of
motor activity with a given lexical item could be interpreted as
evidence against the assumption that motor activity is necessarily
a relevant part of the action word meaning (see also Schuil et al.,
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Table 4 | Results of the post-hoc tests (Bonferroni) for the different
contrasts.
Act.— Act.— Non act.—
Action Pseudoword Non action
TIME WINDOW 120–320ms
Act.—Non action p = 0.010 p = 0.019 p = 0.167
Act.—Action n.s n.s
Act.—Pseudoword n.s
TIME WINDOW 320–520ms
Act.—Non action p = 0.006 p = 0.029 n.s
Act.—Action n.s p = 0.135
Act.—Pseudoword n.s
TIME WINDOW 520–800ms
Act.—Non action p = 0.061 p = 0.123 n.s
Act.—Action n.s n.s
Act.—Pseudoword n.s
Table 5 | Cohen’s d for the differences between the various conditions
in the three time windows.
Act.— Act.— Non act.—
Action Pseudoword Non action
TIME WINDOW 120–320ms
Act.—Non action 1.16 1.14 0.67
Act.—Action 0.09 0.33
Act.—Pseudoword 0.28
TIME WINDOW 320–520ms
Act.—Non action 1.02 1.05 0.39
Act.—Action 0.19 0.79
Act.—Pseudoword 0.81
TIME WINDOW 520–800ms
Act.—Non action 0.84 0.90 0.27
Act.—Action 0.10 0.84
Act.—Pseudoword 0.61
2013). If motor semantic features were indeed accessed via amod-
ular, exhaustive and context-independent process (c.f. Swinney
and Love, 2002) motor structures should be recruited in a con-
sistent and mandatory manner. This, however, is clearly not the
case. Yet, “low level” lexical semantic process and “higher level”
processes of meaning integration are not serial, discrete, and
encapsulated operations (for other examples concerning seman-
tics as well as syntax see Friston, 2003; Kamide et al., 2003; McRae
et al., 2005; Chambers and Juan, 2008; Bicknell et al., 2010;
Matsuki et al., 2011; Papeo et al., 2012). Context can anticipate
motor semantic features of lexical items (Experiment 2) and can
also switch them off when they are not relevant within the sit-
uation model (Experiment 1). Findings like these question the
notion that motor semantic features are “fixed parts” of the action
word meaning (Hoenig et al., 2008; Raposo et al., 2009; Egorova
et al., 2013; Tomasino and Rumiati, 2013). Note that even when
a verb such as “open” is processed in isolation, comprehenders
are likely to represent meaning by reference to some frequently
encountered situation, e.g., opening a door or a bottle (see the
situated concept representation proposed by Barsalou, 2003).
The question about the functional or epiphenomenal nature
of motor structures in action-language processing might there-
fore not be put in terms of its participation to lexical semantics
processing or to the construction of situation models. Rather, to
determine the role of motor structures in language processes it is
necessary to take into account the fact that language comprehen-
sion involves several sources of information that are elaborated in
parallel and continuously adjusted to make sense of an utterance
as it is perceived (Allwood, 2003; Cuyckens et al., 2003; Elman,
2011). Classical accounts of language-induced motor activity that
sees language-induced sensorimotor activity either as epiphe-
nomenon (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Hickok, 2009) or as
integral part of word meaning (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999;
Pulvermuller, 1999) are both problematic in that they assume a
model that endorses a fixed, dictionary-like set of lexical represen-
tations. The here-demonstrated rapidity, flexibility, and context
dependency of language-induced motor activity to one and the
same word are not compatible with such view. Rather, follow-
ing Evans and Green (2006) and Elman (2011), we believe that
words are “operators” that alter mental states (i.e., situation
models) in context-dependent and lawful ways. If the timing
under which an effect occurs is indicative of its source (lex-
ical meaning or post-lexical) the early language-driven motor
effects that we observed in our experiments allow suggesting
that motor activity takes part in the action word meaning con-
struction in conditions in which the action is in the linguistic
focus.
In short, motor knowledge is part of the meaning potential of
action words. It participates in the construction of meaning when
a currently modeled situation focuses the action and might serve
meaning-specification. It also allows prediction and pattern com-
pletion, which are important processes for fluent and efficient
online language comprehension.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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